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of punitive damages before the defendant's resources are depleted."
This encouragement to bring suit, however, is not an entirely undesir-
able goal because many violations causing small, individual financial
losses to numerous plaintiffs might otherwise not be worth the ex-
pense of court proceedings to a single plaintiff. Moreover, if the primary
purposes of punitive damages are to punish and to deter the wrong-
doer, the fact that the first few plaintiffs might recover punitive dam-
ages while the others may not would not affect the accomplishment of
that purpose. The additional compensation given to the initial plaintiff
is merely a windfall." The plaintiff's claim for punitive damages should
be based upon the fact that potential wrongdoers should be deterred,
and that the defendant's conduct warrants punishment rather than
that the plaintiff is entitled to additional compensation.
It should be kept in mind that punitive damages would not be
awarded merely on the finding that material information was omitted
or misstated in a registration statement or prospectus. Juries would be
instructed, after hearing evidence about the defendant's financial
position and prior punitive damages, to award punitive damages only
if the defendant's conduct was wilful and wanton, or, as the district
court said in Globus, indicated "a high moral culpability!'" This would
be a stricter test than the "willfullness tests" of the 1933 Act on which
simple actual damages may be based. Thus, the award of punitive
damages for securities violations, if limited as suggested above, would
increase the protection available to the buying public.
MARK P. HARMON
Products Liability—Statute of Limitations—Application of the Con-
tract Statute of Limitations to a Cause of Action for Strict Liability
in Tort—Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.'—In October, 1958
defendant Pittsburg Plate Glass Company installed a glass door at
the front entrance to the Rochester, New York building of the Central
Trust Company. The Plaintiff, Cecile Mendel, alleged that on October
29, 1965, while walking through the door, it struck her causing her
to fall and suffer personal injuries. In 1967 the plaintiff and her
husband initiated an action against the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Com-
pany in which they alleged that a fault in the door caused the in-
juries.' Recovery was sought both on the theories of tort and contract.
58 Note, 82 liarv. L. Rev. 951, 957 (1969).
54 Comment, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517, 525
(1957).
55 287 F. Supp. at 193.
56 Securities Act of 1933, § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77yyy (1964).
1 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969).
2 The plaintiff and her husband also initiated an action against the owners of the
building, the Central Trust Company.
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Two causes of action in the complaint were based on a negligence
theory and sought recovery for Mrs. Mendel's personal injuries and
for the loss her husband suffered as a result of her injuries. Two
additional causes of action were based on the theory of breach of
implied warranty.'
In August of 1967, the Supreme Court of Munroe County, New
York granted the company's motion to dismiss the third and fourth
causes of action on the ground that the statute of limitations had run.
That court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the concept of "strict
tort liability" governed breaches of warranty, and that the three-year
tort statute of limitation began running from the time of the injury.
The supreme court held that the six-year contract statute of limita-
tion applied to the case and the statute commenced running in 1958,
the date of the sale' The court felt that despite the abandonment of
the concept of privity in breach of warranty situations, a third party
user should be allowed the same right of relief as a party to the con-
tract.' On October 30, 1969 the Court of Appeals of New York, in a
four to three decision, affirmed the holdings of the supreme court,
The issues on appeal were: (1) whether a non-party user's cause
of action giving rise to liability for personal injuries allegedly caused
by an unreasonably dangerous condition in a defective product lies
in contract or tort, and (2) whether the applicable statute of limitation
commences running from the date of sale of the defective product
or the date of the plaintiff's injury. The court held that a cause of
action for breach of warranty is governed by the six-year contract
statute of limitation and that this statute runs from the time of the
making of the contract. A majority of the justices felt that strict
liability in tort and implied warranty in the absence of privity were
actually the same cause of action, 7
 and that the statute of limitation
for actions in contract was applicable"
This decision illustrates that the development of products liability
law based upon tort theory and the parallel emergence of the Uniform
Commercial Code treatment of breaches of warranty have led to con-
fusion and inconsistency.° Two issues which remain unsettled are
3 The plaintiffs' cause of action founded on breach of implied warranty was dis-
missed. The plaintiffs took no appeal from this dismissal.
4 Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 57 Misc 2d 45, 291 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1967).
The contract statute of limitations which the court applied is found in N.Y. Civil Pract.
Law & Rules § 214(5) (McKinney 1963).
6 57 Misc. 2d at 46, 291 N.Y.S.d at 96.
6 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969).
7 Id. at 345 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
8 Id. at 346, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
9 See generally Shanker, Strict Tort ,Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform
Commercial Code: A Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclipse, Pigeonholes and Com-
munication Barriers, 17 W. Res. L. Rev. 5 (1965). The author applauds the justice and
results of cases decided on an independent tort theory of strict liability but deplores the
fact that strict liability in tort and the Uniform Commercial Code appear to be tom-
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whether the cause of action accruing to a plaintiff injured by a de-
fective product is grounded in tort or contract, and whether the tort
or contract statute of limitations applies." The issues may be resolved
either by recognizing a cause of action based upon strict liability in
tort, by expanding the warranty concept of contract theory to give
third parties not in privity the right to sue on a theory of breach of
warranty, expressed or implied, or by recognizing the existence of both
such causes of action and applying one to the facts of the case.
Section 2-318 of the U.C.C. 11 creates a right of action based
upon the contract in favor of third party beneficiaries. It extends to
the buyer's family, household, and guests the benefit of the same war-
ranty which the buyer received in the contract of sale, and expressly
discards technical concepts of privity. Beyond the inclusion of these
classes of third party beneficiaries, this section of the Code is neutral
and purports not to enlarge or restrict "developing case law on
whether the seller's warranties" extend to other persons coming in
contact with the product." Section 2-725 of the Code sets a period of
limitation for breach of any contract of sale. Subdivision (1) pro-
vides that no action may be brought after four years from the time the
cause of action accrues. Subdivision (2) declares that a cause of action
accrues when the breach occurs notwithstanding lack of knowledge
of the breach on the part of the plaintiff. The purpose of section 2-725
appears to be the achievement of commercial uniformity among the
states."
The Mendel court was influenced by the fact that in 1964 the
New York Legislature adopted the Uniform Commercial Code. Al-
though the Code did not govern the case since the contract was
entered into before the Code became law in New York, the court felt
that the legislative intent with respect to actions based on breach of
implied warranty was to apply the same statute of limitation to plain-
tiffs not in privity as is applied to those in privity. The court also felt
that the legislative intent was that the Code warranty provisions
peting bodies of law. Rather, it is urged, the tort scholars and commercial lawyers
should get together and formulate an amalgamated body of products liability law.
,to E.g., see Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrine: Contrasts Between
the Uniforrit Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 Rutgers L. Rev. 692,
704-07 (1965); Note, Manufacturer's Strict Tort Liability to Consumers for Economic
Loss, 41 St. John's U.L. Rev. 401, 411 (1967).
U.C.C. 	 2-318 provides:
A seller's warranty whether expressed or implied extends to any natural person
who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home
if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected
by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller
may not include or limit the operation of this section.
Unless otherwise specified, all references to the Uniform Commercial Code are to
the 1962 Official Text.
12 	§ 2-318, Comment 3.
12 U.C.C. 2-725, Comment.
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were to manifestly pre-empt the field. 14 As a result the majority in
Mendel refused to find that there was an independent cause of action
founded in strict tort liability, and held that the only applicable
theory, apart from that of traditional negligence, is the expanded
warranty concept implicit in Section 2-318 of the Code. In fact, the
majority stated that "strict liability in tort and implied warranty in
the absence of privity are merely different ways of describing the
same cause of action.""
The majority in Mendel refused to recognize the existence of an
independent cause of action founded in strict tort liability partly
because of the fear that many unfounded suits would be brought
against manufacturers if the tort statute of limitations, which runs
from the time of the injury, was held to apply." The majority opinion
was based upon the court's desire to avoid the possibility that "those
plaintiffs not in privity . . . would be entitled to pick and choose be-
tween the Code's four-year-from-the-time-of-the-sale, and . . . (the)
three-year-from-the-time-of-injury limitation period, depending upon
which, under the facts of a given case, would grant them the largest
period of time to sue!'" The majority felt that it would be absurd
to have two different limitation periods applicable to the "same cause
of action with the same elements of proof complaining of the very
same wrong.""
The reasoning of the majority in Mendel is based on the court's
interpretation of two earlier New York decisions. In the 1953 case of
Blessington a McCrory Stores Corp., 19 an administrator whose infant
son died as a result of burns suffered from the ignition of an allegedly
defective cowboy suit brought an implied warranty action against the
retailer and a negligence action against both the retailer and the man-
ufacturer. The tort statute of limitations clearly barred the negligence
actions, since more than three years had elapsed between the occur-
rence of the accident and the commencement of the action. The New
York Court of Appeals, however, held that the warranty action was
independent of any negligence theory, was subject to the contract
statute of limitations, and was not barred since it was commenced
within the six-year contract statute of limitation.' The majority in
Mendel interpreted Blessington as requiring the application of the
contract statute of limitations to actions which are not founded on
negligence and which seek recovery for injuries due to defective
products?'
The reasoning of the majority in Mendel is further buttressed by
14 25 N.Y.2d at 344-45, 253 N.E.2d at 209-10, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 493-94.
12 Id at 345, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
12 Id. at 345, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
12 Id. at 345, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
12 Id.
10 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953), 122 N.Y.S.2d 140.
20 Id. at 147, 111 N.E.2d at 422-23, 122 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
21 25 N.Y.2d at 343, 253 N.E2d at 209, 305 N.YS.2d at 492.
1041
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
its interpretation of Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp." In
Goldberg an administratrix sued the manufacturer of an aircraft and
the supplier of the aircraft's altimeter for breach of warranty re-
sulting in the death of her daughter caused from injuries suffered in
an airplane crash. The New York Court of Appeals held that the
airplane manufacturer could be held liable despite the lack of privity,
but that the supplier of the altimeter could not be held liable since
the plaintiff could be adequately compensated in a successful suit
against the manufacturer.23 The majority in Mendel interpreted Gold-
berg as extending the concept of implied warranty by rejecting the
requirement of privity rather than as establishing a new cause of
action of strict liability in tort. Thus, as seen by the Mendel majority,
"Goldberg stands for the proposition that notwithstanding the absence
of privity, the cause of of action which exists in favor of third-party
strangers to the contract is an action for breach of implied war-
ranty."24
The majority decision in Mendel finds support in several Penn-
sylvania decisions. In Engelman v. Eastern Light Co.,' where the
plaintiff's injury was caused by an electrical defect in a washing
machine which the plaintiff had purchased from the defendant, the
Court of Common Pleas of Carbon County, Pennsylvania considered
whether an action for personal injuries which was based solely on
breach of warranty had to be brought within the two-year personal
injury limitation period, or whether it could be brought within the
four-year contract limitation under the Uniform Commercial Code.
The court held that the Code's statute of limitations applied to actions
for personal injury arising out of breach of warranty in the absence
of a provision in the contract for a lesser time." The court reasoned
that the Code was the latest expression of legislative interest, that
the general provisions of the Code plainly indicated an intention to
occupy the field and achieve uniformity, and that since the Code deals
with a narrow subject matter carved out of the broad field of per-
sonal injuries, the specific enactment is controlling over the general
personal injury enactment.
The Engelman decision was considered by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania in Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works." In that
case the plaintiff brought an action to recover damages for personal
injuries received allegedly as a result of defendant's breach of an
implied warranty to transmit gas in a safe manner through an under-
ground conduit into plaintiff's home. The plaintiffs alleged a defect
in the conduit in an action brought after the two-year statute of
22 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
23 12 N.Y.2d at 437, 191 N.E.2d at 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
24 25 N.Y.2d at 344, 253 N.E.2d at 209, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
23 30 Pa. D. & C.2d 38 (C.P. Carbon County 1962).
23 Id. at 44.
27 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612 (1964).
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limitations for personal injuries had expired but before the four-year
period of limitation on actions for breach of contract of sale estab-
lished by the Uniform Commercial Code had run. The court held that
the legislature intended the Code limitation to apply to breaches of
contracts of sale regardless of whether personal injuries were involved
or not The court in so holding cited the legislative intent "that there
be a four-year period of limitation on all actions for breach of con-
tracts for sale, irrespective of whether the damages sought are for
personal injuries or otherwise."'
Although the Pennsylvania decisions appear to support the
majority in Mendel, a closer examination shows that it is quite un-
clear how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would have decided the
Mendel case. The Pennsylvania cases all involved parties who were
either in privity or who were both in the distributive chain of the
product, for example, a manufacturer and an ultimate purchaser
Thus, in such cases it was less difficult to apply a contract theory to
parties who had bound themselves, either directly or through distribu-
tors, by a purchase and sale contract. Also, in the Pennsylvania
decisions all of the plaintiffs had clearly sued on a contract theory.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not considered whether
the contract statute of limitation applies when that statute would bar
an otherwise valid claim if, under the tort statute of limitations, which
would run from the date of the injury, the claim would not be barred.
Unless a court felt bound by authority to so hold, it would be reluc-
tant to bar an otherwise valid claim. Thus, when faced with a situation
where application of the contract statute of limitations would bar a
claim, especially where the claim is for personal injuries by one not
party to a contractual relationship, the court would be at least reluc-
tant to apply such a statute 30
The dissenting opinion in Mendel disagreed with the majority'S
interpretation of the effect of the Uniform Commercial Code and the
Blessington and Kollsman cases. The views of the dissenting justices
were considerably influenced by the recent authorities who support
the existence of a cause of action based on strict liability in tort, inde-
pendent of both contract law and the Code. Foremost among these
authorities is Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts (Second). That
section provides that one who sells any defective product "unreason-
ably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property" is liable
for harm befalling the "ultimate user or consumer." The liability is
28 Id. at 420, 197 A.2d at 614.
29 Id.
89 There is some limited authority that Pennsylvania does accept the tort of strict
liability, see Hoeflich v. William S Merrel Co., 288 F. Supp. 659, 661 (ED. Pa. 1968).
The majority in Mendel did not consider this line of Pennsylvania decisions, but
other courts, in considering whether the Code or tort statute of limitations should apply
in an action for damages caused by a breach of implied warranty, have relied on the
Pennsylvania cases. See, e.g., Val Decker Packing Co. v. Corn Prods. Sales Co., 411
F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1969).
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limited to the seller who is engaged in the business of selling the pro-
duct and with the proviso that the product reaches the customer
without material change." The Restatement clearly indicates that the
consumer need not have bought the product nor entered into a con-
tractual relationship with the seller, and that the cause of action is
founded in tort rather than contract or the Uniform Commercial
Code.32 Thus, the Restatement indicates that there exists an indepen-
dent cause of action based neither on negligence nor contract law but
rather on strict liability in tort.
A growing number of commentators also argue that there exists
such an independent cause of action. Dean Prosser contends that con-
fusion has resulted from the use of the term "warranty" in respect to
products liability law. In spite of this confusion he indicates that
under strict liability in tort the word "warranty" does not imply the
traditional concept whereby a warranty is extended from the seller to
the buyer, but refers to "something separate and distinct which sounds
in tort exclusively, and . . . which exists apart from any contract be-
tween the parties."'
The gradual acceptance of this independent tort is also found in
developing case law. The dissenters in Mendel take the position that
Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.34 represents a recognition by
the New York Court of Appeals of this developing theory, and the
acceptance by the court of this new tort rather than, as the majority
held, a rejection of the requirement of privity in certain contractual-
products liability actions.' Several other jurisdictions, most notably
New Jersey and California, have also held that there exists a course
of action based on strict liability in tort not governed by contract law,
the Uniform Sales Act or the Uniform Commercial Code." The New
Jersey Supreme Court, in a case similar to Mendel, allowed a plaintiff
to bring an action fourteen years after the product was purchased
That court held that the cause of action accrued when the injury
occurred, and that the applicable statute of limitations was that gov-
erning tort actions rather than Section 2-725 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code."
The decisions of these courts were generally prompted by a
31 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
32 Id., Comment m.
33 Prosser, Spectacular Change: Products Liability in General, 36 Cleve. B. Ass'n
J. 149, 167-68 (1965). See also W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 97, at 681 (3d ed. 1964),
where the author advocates the abandonment of "the elusory contract" that is con-
fusing the concept of strict liability in tort.
84 12 N.Y.2d 432, N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
35 25 N.Y.2d at 348, 253 N.E.2d at 213, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 497.
86 See Schipper v. Builders Supply Corp., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Santor
v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 304 (1965); Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897 (1963), 27 Cal. Rptr 697, Operating
Engineers Local 57 v. Chrysler Motors Corp. — R.I. —, 258 A.2d 271 (1969); Holifield
v. Setco Industries, Inc. 42 Wisc. 2d 750, 168 N.W.2d 177 (1969).
37 Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968).
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desire to avoid applying complex contractual or commercial require-
ments to essentially tortious actions. They felt that the public would
be best served and protected if the laws governing commercial rela-
tionships, such as those relating to the disclaimer of warranties and
notice of defect requirements, were not made applicable to product
liability cases." They recognized, as did the dissenters in Mendel,
that such a holding would not be unduly prejudicial to manufacturers
since, though a plaintiff need not prove that the manufacturer was
negligent, he still must prove that the defect existed while the product
was under the control of the manufacturer, and that the harm was
the proximate result of the defect." The passage of time makes it
difficult to prove that the defect was attributable to the manufacturer
rather than to users or repairers. Thus, the plaintiff's case as well as
the defendant's is weakened by a considerable passage of time. Also,
contributory negligence or assumption of the risk are defenses avail-
able to the manufacturer in an action of strict liability in tort."
Once the concept of strict liability in tort is accepted, the courts
are faced with the difficult question of whether the Uniform Commer-
cial Code or the new tort theory is applicable." In jurisdictions which
recognize the existence of this new tort, the Code is still law, and
although the elements of proof in an action based on strict liability
are very similar to those of an action for breach of implied warranty,
certain elements of proof and defenses differ." Inconsistencies be-
tween the two theories occur in relationship to (1) disclaimers of the
warranties," (2) the requirements that the defendant be given timely
notice of the defect," (.3) express warranties greater than the
standard imposed by tort law," (4) the time of accrual of a cause of
88 See Santor v. A & M Raragheusian Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 304 (1965);
Restatement (Second) Torts § 402A, Comment m (1965); W. Prosser, supra note 33,
§ 97, at 681 (3d ed. 1964).
88 25 N.Y.2d at 351, 253 N.E.2d at 213, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 499. Santor v. A & M
Raragheusian Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 67, 207 A.2d 304, 313 (1965).
48 This is not entirely clear since there is some authority for the proposition that
contributory negligence is not a defense, Restatement (Second) Torts § 402A, Comment
n (1965), although assumption of the risk is more generally accepted as a defense. Id.
Wisconsin accepts contributory negligence as a defense. Holifield v. Setco Indus.
Inc., 42 Wisc. 2d 750, 756, 168 N.W.2d 177, 180 (1969). See also W. Prosser, supra
note 33, § 95, at 656.
41 The Code has been adopted in all jurisdictions except Louisiana.
42 The majority in the Mendel case were wrong in holding that strict tort and implied
warranty are the same cause of action. 25 N.Y. 2d at 345, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.
2d at 494. For an article enumerating the inconsistencies see Rapson, supra note 10.
43 See, W. Prosser, supra note 33, § 97 at 680. The Code, of course, allows a seller
to disclaim warranties, U.C.C. § 2-316, but limits their application, especially where the
disclaimer concerns personal injuries. U.C.C. § 2-719(3); see also Boshkoff, Some
Thoughts about Physical Harm, Disclaimers and Warranties, 4 B.C. Ind. & Cora. L.
Rev. 304 (1962).
44 U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) provides that the buyer must notify the seller within a
reasonable time after a breach is discovered. Under strict tort liability there is no notice
requirement. Rapson, supra note 10, at 707.
45 n is possible to give an express warranty under the Code which gives a buyer
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action, and (5) the length of the limitation period running from such
accrual. Where one of these elements is present in a case, and that
element alone can determine the court's decision, (a situation which
will arise most often when the defendant moves to dismiss on the
grounds that one of the prerequisites is lacking), the court will have
to decide whether the prerequisite is required by law, and therefore
decide which theory is applicable to the case.
This decision may be difficult since there is a great area where
both the Uniform Commercial Code and tort law apply. Generally,
whenever a merchant sells his regular product in the normal course
of business both the Code and tort law apply." In a factual situation
where it is obvious that recovery will be granted under either theory,
there will be no dispute; but where under one theory, generally the
Code, rceovery would be denied, while under the other it would be
granted, there will be a dispute.
Thus, courts generally decide that only one theory may apply. 44
That is, they decide that there is a cause of action on tort theory
which is free of the requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code
and is applicable to the facts before the court, or that such a cause of
action is not applicable and the Code governs, or that the Code has
preempted the field so that there is no cause of action under tort law.
It is doubtful that a court would rule that strict liability in tort had
pre-empted the legislatively enacted Uniform Commercial Code. Thus,
unless the court decides, as did the majority in Mendel, that the Code
pre-empts all non-negligent products liability law, it will have to
decide which conflicting theory is most applicable to the facts of the
case before it. In doing so courts will attempt to arrive at some
standard by which the applicability of the conflicting theories can be
gauged in light of the facts of the case.
The dissenting justices in Mendel as well as the other courts
which have accepted the concept of strict liability in tort, have neither
greater rights than those imposed by strict tort law. In a recent article Professor Dono-
van gives the example of the car manufacturer who advertised that his brakes were
twice as good as those of his competition. If a person bought a car and was injured
because he relied on the warranty but the brakes were only as good as the competitors,
the injured party has a cause of action based on express warranty but under the law
of strict tort liability, and the measure of reasonableness of the defect, he could not
recover. Donovan, Recent Developments in Products Liability in New England: The
Emerging Confrontation Between the Expanding Law of Torts and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 19 U. Me. L. Rev. 181, 250 (1967).
46 Donovan, supra note 45, at 252.
47 This may be the result of the plaintiff's choice of pleadings but more generally
it is an example of the "eclipse" theory. Both the Code and the new tort attempt to
occupy the entire field. The Code attempts to establish uniform rules while the tort
law is purportedly free of all contract requirements. As a result it is difficult for a
court to hold that both causes of action are equally applicable to a particular factual
situation.
48 But see Operating Engineers Local 57 v. Chrysler Motors Corp., — R.I. —, 258
A.2d 271, 273 (1969), where the court held that the Code did not apply since there was
no buyer-seller relationship.
1046
CASE NOTES
considered the problem nor attempted to evolve such a standard."
Commentators have, however, suggested that the applicability of a
cause of action can best be determined by examining the policy under-
lying that theory."
Such an examination indicates that the theories are not really
competing since they should apply to different situations. Generally,
parties to a tort action are legal strangers whose relationship and
respective rights and liabilities are imposed by law. Their relationship
is determined by standards which apply to the public at large, and
although liability may hinge somewhat on their respective circum-
stances and their relationship to each other, their rights are not
determined by an agreement between the parties." The parties do not
acquire unique rights, that is rights which any other person similarly
situated, would not acquire.
The law of sales, on the other hand, elaborates the duties of
performance which attach to a contract for sale." The parties' rights
and liabilities are founded on the existence and terms of a particular
contract to which they have agreed. The law of sales is merely de-
signed to aid in the interpretation and enforcement of that contract.
Thus, where a contract does not exist, or if it is particularly remote,
the law of sales should not govern. This situation arises when there is
a contract for sale between a manufacturer and a distributor, who
later sells products to the retailer who in turn sells to a consumer. In
such a situation the original contract and the law of sales is no more
appropriate for determining the relationship of the manufacturer to
the consuming public than it should be in determining the liabilities
of the manufacturer in respect to the use of his automobile. This is
similar to the situation involving an automobile insurance contract,
which does not effect the liability of the insured to third parties. Thus,
the test would be whether a plaintiff user of a product has been
differentiated from the general public by a contract with the manu-
facturer; if so, the law of sales should govern, if not then tort law
controls.
If the choice of legal theory were made in light of the policy
underlying each theory, a problem which was raised by the Mendel
court would easily be resolved. The majority in Mendel was troubled
by the possibility that because of the law of strict liability in tort,
immediate parties to a sale could have lesser rights than remote par-
ties." This could occur if there is, for example, the requirement that
the injured party give timely notice of a defect to the defendant. If
the Code applied to immediate parties to a contract of sale, and tort
theory applied to remote consumers or non-purchasing users, the more
49 Littlefield, Some Thoughts on Products Liability Law: A Reply to Professor
Shan5keri 18 W. Res. L. Rev. 10, 27-28 (1966).0d
51 Id.
52 25 N.Y.2d at 345, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
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remote consumers would be more likely to recover, since they need
not comply with the notice requirements. Such a possibility influenced
the majority in Mendel to reject the concept of strict liability.
Nevertheless, this result is completely acceptable if viewed in
relation to the policies of the two bodies of law. The remote user is
essentially a member of the general public. He is undifferentiated and
has neither increased nor decreased his rights by an agreement. As
such it would be inappropriate to apply a notice provision to him
since that provision is intended to enable parties to a contract to
rectify defects. It would also be appropriate to apply any warranty or
disclaimer provisions to the remote user since that user has not agreed
to limit or expand his rights by means of the contract. His rights are
therefore that of the general public, and as such tort law should apply
even if this would enable him to recover where an immediate party to
the contract would be barred.
This approach is particularly applicable to situations necessitat-
ing a choice between statutes of limitation. If a person is a party to a
contract, it is relatively easy for him to discover the defect within the
period of time from when the contract was made. The time of the
making of the contract of sale usually represents the first instance the
party came into contact with the product and the first instance that
the party would have the right to sue for alleged defects. If the user
or consumer was not related to the contract, it is irrelevant to compute
the limitation period from the time the contract was made. The user
may not have come into contact with the product at this time. The
remote user certainly did not have a cause of action at the time of
the making of the contract, since he could not recover until he was
injured. Nor does the fact that the goods did not conform to the origi-
nal contract give a remote user a cause of action. This is illustrated
by the facts of the Mendel case where the plaintiff was a complete
stranger to the contract involving the sale of the door. She was not at
all aware of the time of the making of the contract, she had no period
of time dating from that time to inspect for defects, nor had she con-
tracted as to her rights and liabilities with respect to the door. Just
as the terms of the contract should not bind the plaintiff in Mendel,
neither should the contract statute of limitations.
Although the result advocated by the dissenters in Mendel is
correct, they did not consider the problem which arises after the
court accepts the doctrine of strict tort liability. That problem is to
determine the circumstances under which the new tort applies as
opposed to those under which the Uniform Commercial Code applies.
Because the majority rejected the assistance of the new tort they were
not faced with this problem. Since the majority position appears to be
in error and contrary to the trend of American law, it is necessary to
develop a standard to determine the applicability of the respective
theories. The most rational source of such a standard is the policies
underlying tort and contract law. Such a standard will enable the
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courts when faced with a dispute in which a cause of action is brought
in tort, but where the court feels that the theory is inappropriate, to
avoid a complete rejection of the existence of the independent tort of
strict product liability.
WILLIAM H. ISE
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